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1400, 29 Mar 79

GIST OF DDCI'S 28 MARCH RHODESIA BRIEFING

- I. Reviewed all out Rhodesian effort for a big show to portray as compliance with black rule

(Map of 5
Districts)

-Whites vote 10 April for white seats; black & white vote, (rolling security forces through military districts) for black seats in 5 day period after 12 April

(Flow Chart) II. Then described process of forming government

(Pie Chart) III. Figure most likely winner Muzorewa

(Leadership Graphic) IV. Election's impact on power balance only one part of a complex equation that includes

- Deepening Nkomo-Mugabe rift
- Dissention in ZIPRA ranks
- Nkomo's political decline - 5
- Hardening South African attitude, throwing weight behind internal settlement
- Growing western support for internal settlement, e.g. Thatcher & US Congress

*Why?
See response
enclosed
after graphic's*

All of which could lead to a variety of possible alliances.

- V. Muzorewa will move to strengthen relations with whites, induce ZAPU/ZANU defections and try to deal with Mugabe or Nkomo

- Has approached Mugabe. Shona-based alliance?
- Nkomo? Less white resistance
- Don't expect he'll be able to deal.

- VI. Frontline states will face hard choices, but US & UK face larger dilemma

- A. Recognition & lifting sanctions would strengthen new gov't, but

- erode our special relation with black Africa
- increase pressure for Soviet supported war.

- B. No recognition & press for all parties settlement

- white extremists would gain influence
- black Africans would support

- C. Congress insistence on lifting sanctions would lose main US leverage

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DDCI Notes
28 Mar 79

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RHODESIA

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I. Elections. Mid-April. Case-Javits determination.

II.

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(Map of 5 Mil.
Districts)

D. Whites, vote 10 April; blacks vote during same 5 day period after 12 April. Security forces rotated from one military district to another to provide maximum security.

(Pie Chart)

III. Rhodesians hope for 60% turnout. Pressure. Say is valid if only 20% of blacks vote. Will directly elect 72 blacks and 20 whites ; 8 whites indirectly. Separate districts and rolls for white and black members.

Face to Face
(Maps of Voting
Constituencies)
(Election Flow
Chart)

A. Most likely victor is Muzorewa. Should win more than 1/2 of 72 black seats. Sithole has lost ground. Less than 1/3 of votes.
B. Despite results, ~~Whites will control military, police, judiciary and civil service.~~ Smith's Rhodesian Front Party is unopposed. Uncertain what role Smith will play.

C. Most whites not enthused but saying Let's try it. In January emigration reduced to about 1,000/mo.

IV. Election will not end war, nor will government win widespread recognition. Question is will accession of black government, albeit one with limited powers, alter the power balance.

(African
Leadership
Graphic)

A. By itself answer is no. But election can't be looked at as an isolated event. Must be viewed as part of complex equation.

- Deepening Mugabe - Nkomo rift.
- Dissention in Zipra ranks. Nkomo political decline.
- Hardening South African attitude. Throwing weight behind int. settlement
- Growing western support for internal settlement. US Congress and Thatcher.

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V. These factors account for growing confidence by white Rhodesians. Risk is that it will also harden their attitude and reduce chances of a political deal among blacks that could lead toward an eventual solution.

VI. Muzorewa will move to strengthen relations with Whites, establish control in countryside, and induce defections from ZAPU and ZANU. Will probably also try to split Patriotic Front even further.

- (Population Map)
- A. A Shona-based alliance between Muzorewa's party and Mugabe's ZANU. About 75% of blacks are Shona. Has already approached Mugabe about joining government.
 - B. Muzorewa and Nkomo could cut a deal. While different tribes, White resistance to Nkomo alliance less than Mugabe.
 - C. Many obstacles to both these deals; biggest impulse comes from mutual fear by Mugabe and Nkomo that other will cut a deal first.
 - D. Neither of above alignments would tip balance sufficiently to end fighting, but could change complexion of war from one of equilibrium with prospect of growing strength on guerrilla side to one of momentum for internal solution.

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VII. Election will create hard choices for the External Players.

-
- A. Front line states will continue to support guerrillas, but intensification of fighting could force Kaunda and Machel to accept open-ended commitment to Soviet and Cuban presence. *Don't want.* They also face prospects of supporting rivals in civil war. Thus, might support a deal under appropriate circumstances.
 - B. Soviets presently backing Nkomo. Risk alienating Nyerere and Machel who also want Mugabe supported. If Nkomo cuts a deal with Muzorewa they have to choose between ZAPU and White allies *or* to shift to ZANU. If support both groups they retain credentials with Front line states, but risk becoming involved in civil war.

VIII. Even larger dilemma faces US and UK:

- A. Western recognition and the lifting of economic sanctions would:
 1. Strengthen the position of the new government. There would be greater white resolve to support the black-led government and more willingness among whites in the military to defend it. Government could attract significant number of defectors from guerrilla forces.
 2. Improve the chances of stemming Rhodesia's economic decline. Worldwide demand is increasing for many goods produced by the Rhodesians such as copper, chrome and gold.

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3. Provoke a serious erosion in the "special relationship" that the US has fostered with black African leaders-- particularly Nyerere, Kaunda, and Obasanjo. They would conclude that the Anglo-American plan for Rhodesia was dead, and would come under increased pressure to seek a military solution in Rhodesia.
4. If the US and the UK pushed for the inclusion of ZANU and ZAPU in the new government, this might appease some of the African leaders. A call for the adoption of a new constitution providing for a quicker transition to black majority rule and approved by all Rhodesians--not just the whites--also might dispell some of the anger. This option, however, still would risk a major escalation of Soviet and Cuban involvement on the side of whatever guerrilla group is excluded from the government.

B. If West opts against recognition and lifting sanctions and continues to press negotiated settlement involving all parties to the dispute:

1. The internal government's ability to take hold would be weakened. Emigration probably would increase. White extremist attitudes gain currency and last ditch military stand becomes only alternative. *Deals between blacks more unlikely.*
2. The Front line states and Nigeria would continue to support the Anglo-American efforts toward a political settlement. They would regard the election merely as one step in a process that eventually will involve the guerrillas in a negotiated settlement.
3. ^{But} ~~Meanwhile~~, Soviet and Cuban involvement with the guerrilla forces and in their host states would ^{still} increase.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

X. In sum:

- A. Everybody confident now--Whites, ZAPU, ZANU. Pre-election struggle will provide test of military strength. *Elections could shift center of gravity slightly away from guerrillas if whites maintain security.*
- B. Once in power, Muzorewa is likely to make overtures to either Mugabe or Nkomo, but we doubt at this point that the white leaders will show sufficient flexibility to allow Muzorewa to cut a deal

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attractive enough to bring either guerrilla leader into the internal settlement. He may, however, be able to induce significant defections. A successful all parties conference or agreement to hold UN supervised elections are not in the cards.

- C. Short-term prospects are for a continuing stalemate, particularly if South Africa opts to commit its resources in support of the new government of national unity.
- D. Over the long run, time probably is on the side of the guerrilla forces. The continuing struggle will provide expanding opportunities for the Soviets and the Cubans and prove costly for the West.
Even if whites collapse after prolonged struggle we anticipate turmoil as blacks compete for power.


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
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
Constituencies for the Election of 20 White Members to the Zimbabwe Rhodesia House of Assembly



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


Constituencies for the Election of 72 Black Members to the Zimbabwe Rhodesia House of Assembly




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Formation of Government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia



Population Distribution in Zimbabwe Rhodesia



ETHNIC GROUP	PERCENT OF BLACK POPULATION
Shona	75
Karanga	25
Zezeru	21
Manyika	11
Ndau	6
Korekore	5
Other	5
Ndebele	14
Kalanga	7
Other (Tonga, Venda, Sena)	4

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Lifting sanctions.

President is obligated to make determination of lifting sanctions--no time frame set.

Two issues must be satisfied.

1. Internal Rhod. All parties conference required--in good faith. Conference called but not held. Everyone agrees this was satisfied.
2. Elections--free and fair; basic issue.

But amendment specifically states that to lift sanctions the black majority gov't must be installed--implementation of election results required.

Therefore ~~even if~~ ^{After} elections held, it will take 4-6 weeks before parties elected will have a functioning gov't, therefore Presidential decision cannot be made until then.

If Congress disagrees with Pres. decision, they could decide to lift sanctions via amendment themselves. Vote is very close. Handling of the "lifting sanction" could sway some members either way.

Currently attempt in Foreign Relations Committee for an amendment to lift sanctions 10 days after election--pre-judges election and implementation of results. Not likely to get through--but point is that there is sufficient moves in Congress to lift sanctions if Pres. decision not agreed to.

Peace Corps Authorization

Congress July 25 sent to the president legislation (HR 11877) authorizing \$112,424,000 in fiscal 1979 for the Peace Corps.

The final authorization level was a roughly even split between the \$96.1 million proposed by the House and \$125 million recommended by the Senate. The administration requested \$95.1 million.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee said the additional funding was necessary "to cover overseas inflationary cost increases" and to provide the Peace Corps flexibility to upgrade and expand its program.

The compromise figure of \$112.4 million was a \$29.5 million increase over the \$82.9 million Congress authorized -- and later appropriated -- for fiscal 1978. (1977 Almanac p. 376)

However, the bill also included a \$3.7 million supplemental authorization for fiscal 1978, which the administration also requested. The amount was included in the Senate but not the House bill. Conferees said that since House action in April "inflationary and programming factors" had increased pressures on the Peace Corps budget and made the request "fully justified."

In other provisions, the bill as cleared:

- Earmarked \$1 million in fiscal 1979 as a U.S. contribution to the United Nations volunteer program.
- Authorized the Peace Corps to provide technical assistance and training to help countries develop their own volunteer service.
- Added a provision urging the Peace Corps to pay particular attention to the integration of women into the national economies of developing countries.
- Extended medical malpractice protection to volunteers involved in providing medical treatment.
- Authorized the assignment of volunteers to work in refugee assistance programs.
- Increased to \$20,000 from \$10,000 the amount the Peace Corps could pay to settle damage claims.

HR 11877 was reported by the House International Relations Committee April 11 (H Rept 95-1049) and passed by the House April 25 by a 297-102 vote. (Vote 209, p. 1080)

It was reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee May 12 (S Rept 95-807) and passed by the Senate June 8 by voice vote. The conference report (H Rept 95-1333) was adopted by the Senate June 29 by voice vote and by the House July 25 by a 276-120 roll call. (Vote 520, p. 1996)

the name of realism and pragmatism," he said. "There has been no response [from Turkey]."

The final roll call showed an unusual voting pattern. Democrats split down the middle on the issue, voting 31-31. Northern Democrats opposed lifting the embargo, 17-26, while southern Democrats favored the McGovern/Byrd language 14-5. Republicans cast 26 votes for repeal and 11 against the proposal.

Rhodesian Sanctions

A move by Jesse Helms, R-N.C., to drop U.S. economic sanctions against Rhodesia imposed last year was checked by the Senate July 26 in the second major action on the aid bill. (Background, 1977 Almanac p. 398)

Case - Javits

On June 28, the Senate had voted 48-42 to table an amendment to the State Department authorization bill to lift the sanctions against Rhodesia, a vote that worried the Senate leadership and the Carter administration. (Weekly Report p. 1715)

To reduce the support that had developed for Helms' proposal, sanction supporters came up with an alternative, which the Senate accepted. Sponsored by Sens. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., Jacob K. Javits, R-N.Y., and Daniel P. Moynihan, D-N.Y., the alternative amendment gave President Carter authority to lift the sanctions if two conditions were met by Rhodesia. The president was to determine that:

- ① Rhodesia had committed itself to negotiate in "good faith" with the guerrilla force known as the Patriotic Front and other parties on all relevant issues, including the terms of future majority rule and protection of minority rights.
- ② Free elections were held.

The Carter administration, however, objected to the compromise. The administration has backed giving the guerrillas a place in a new Rhodesian government, contending that no government can last without them.

Helms argued that the sanctions should be lifted because a transitional government is in place in Rhodesia and elections will be held on Dec. 31. The purpose of the sanctions was to "gradually cripple" the economy of Rhodesia to pressure the government of Ian Smith to institute democratic reforms, Helms argued. The principle of democratic majority rule has been established, he said.

But African Affairs Subcommittee Chairman Dick Clark, D-Iowa, strongly protested Helms' proposal: taking that action, he said, could give the white leaders "a false sense of security, thinking that because we lift sanctions, we may, in the last analysis, go further -- perhaps, even as many whites hope -- come in and militarily defend them." Moreover, Clark said, the amendment would represent a "great setback" for U.S. influence in the Third World.

Javits argued that the alternative approach he backed requires the government of Rhodesia to show that it is willing to negotiate with all parties.

But John C. Danforth, R-Mo., who wanted to drop the sanctions entirely, objected to this approach. He said that it pegs American trade policy on Rhodesia's agreement to a procedural approach advocated by the United States.

"It is said that the administration's policies are neutral. . .," Danforth added. "That statement simply is not true. Economic sanctions are used to punish an existing regime, to bring a change in leadership or policy, to damage the economy of another country."




The Senate approved the Case-Javits-Moynihan amendment 59-36 after a motion to table the proposal was rejected, 39-57. (Votes 242, 243, p. 2000)

Helms later formally introduced his amendment to drop the sanctions entirely, but this was withdrawn after an amendment by Danforth to lift the sanctions only between Oct. 1 and Dec. 31, 1978, failed 42-54. (Vote 244, p. 2000)

Following the Senate's vote, Case told reporters that the support Helms had marshalled in recent weeks "obviously expressed unhappiness in a very important sense" in the Senate with the Carter administration's policy that the guerrillas be included in a new Rhodesian government.


The Senate action on the Rhodesia issue came on an amendment offered by S.J. Hayakawa, R-Calif., which, after being amended by the Case proposal, was approved

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
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Rhodesia: Nkomo's Diminished Options 

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Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), seems to have run out of political options, at least for the time being. As a result, he has become locked into a military course of action that could prove disastrous in the long run for him and for ZAPU. To revive his political fortunes, Nkomo needs either an accommodation with the government in Salisbury or a new international push for a political settlement. 

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9 March 1979

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1979

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
The White House

FROM: Cyrus Vance

SUBJECT: Request for SCC Meeting to Consider
Standards for Sensitive Collection
Operations (Sections 1-303 and
1-306 of E.O. 12036)

As I indicated before you left for the Middle East, we need to submit proposed standards under Section 1-303 to the President for his consideration. Staff efforts to reach agreement on a draft have not been successful; I suggest that the SCC meet on this issue very soon.

In my view, the standards and procedures should be governed by the following principles:

1. The DCI should refer all proposals for sensitive collection to the SCC Chairman in writing. The criteria for determining which collections are "sensitive" should distinguish between operations that must be referred to the SCC Chairman

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and those that the DCI has discretion to refer.

2. Sensitive collections normally should be reviewed and approved in advance by the SCC at a meeting, pursuant to written proposals. In exigent circumstances

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3/20/85 (Vance, Cyrus)

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where time is of the essence, proposals can be reviewed and approved by SCC members by secure telephone, followed by written confirmation.

3. The SCC may determine that certain categories of sensitive collections are routine, and may be approved by the SCC Chairman. The SCC should review records of such operations periodically, perhaps quarterly.

4. The annual review required by Section 1-306 should include a review of ongoing operations as well as a review of the DCI's categorization of operations as sensitive.

5. To insure proper security, access to records maintained for purposes of Section 1-303 and Section 1-306 should be tightly controlled, and such records should be stored at the CIA when they are not being used.

cc: The Attorney General
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director of Central Intelligence

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Executive Registry

79-108166

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March 29, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Standards for Sensitive Collection Operations (C)

The attached memorandum from the Secretary of State to Dr. Brzezinski is circulated for your information and whatever staff work you wish to have done on this subject in preparation for an SCC discussion which will be scheduled in the near future. (C)

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Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary

Attachment
S/S 7905228

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Review on March 29, 1985

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